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1Regret Theory and the Competitive Firm
Kit Pong Wong∗
School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong
Abstract
This paper examines the production decision of the competitive firm under uncertainty
when the firm is not only risk averse but also regret averse. Regret-averse preferences are
characterized by a modified utility function that includes disutility from having chosen ex-
post suboptimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the difference between the
actual profit and the maximum profit attained by making the optimal production decision
had the firm observed the true realization of the random output price. If the firm is not
too regret averse, we show that the conventional result that the optimal output level under
uncertainty is less than that under certainty holds. Using a simple binary model wherein
the random output price can take on either a low value or a high value with positive
probability, we show the possibility that the firm may optimally produce more, not less,
under uncertainty than under certainty, particularly when the firm is sufficiently regret
averse and the low output price is very likely to prevail.
JEL classification: D21; D24; D81
Keywords: Production; Regret theory; Uncertainty
1. Introduction
Since the seminal work of Sandmo (1971), the behavior of the competitive firm has
been the subject of considerable research in decision making under uncertainty (Batra and
Ullah, 1974; Broll, 1992; Chavas, 1985; Viaene and Zilcha, 1998; Wong, 1996; to name
just a few). The extant literature assumes that the firm’s preferences admit the standard
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von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation. One notable result is that the
risk-averse firm optimally produces less under uncertainty than under certainty.
In reality, firms may have desires to avoid consequences wherein ex-post suboptimal
decisions appear to have been made even though these decisions are ex-ante optimal based
on the information available at that time. To account for this consideration, Bell (1982,
1983) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) propose regret theory that defines regret as the
disutility arising from not having chosen the ex-post optimal alternative, which is later
axiomatized by Quiggin (1994) and Sugden (1993). Regret theory is supported by a large
body of experimental literature that documents regret-averse preferences among individuals
(see, e.g., Loomes, 1988; Loomes et al., 1992; Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Starmer and
Sugden, 1993).
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate regret theory into Sandmo’s (1971) model
of the competitive firm under uncertainty. To this end, we characterize the firm’s regret-
averse preferences by a modified utility function that includes additive separable disutility
from having chosen ex-post suboptimal alternatives.1 The extent of regret depends on the
difference between the actual profit and the maximum profit attained by making the optimal
production decision had the firm observed the true realization of the random output price.
We are particularly interested in examining the impact of regret on the firm’s production
decision as compared to the benchmark case of certainty.
We show that the firm optimally produces less under uncertainty than under certainty
should the firm be not too regret averse. In this case, the risk-sharing motive remains first-
order important to the firm. Hence, the conventional result of the extant literature that the
optimal output level under uncertainty is smaller than that under certainty applies. This
finding suggests that it is quite possible that the firm may optimally produce more, not
less, under uncertainty than under certainty should the firm be sufficiently regret averse.
1For other applications of regret aversion using a similar modified utility function, see Braun and Muer-
mann (2004) and Wong (2012) in the case of demand for insurance, Muermann et al. (2006) in a portfolio
choice problem, and Tsai (2012) and Wong (2011) in the banking context.
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To verify this conjecture, we develop a binary model wherein the random output price can
take on either a low value or a high value with positive probability. In such a binary model,
we show that the conventional result does not hold if the firm is sufficiently regret averse
and the low output price is very likely to prevail. In this case, the optimal output level
under certainty is very close to the one that is ex-post optimal at the low output price.
The sufficiently regret-averse firm as such optimally adjusts its output level upward so as to
limit the potential regret when the high output price is actually revealed, thereby rendering
the optimal output level under uncertainty to exceed that under certainty.
This paper is closely related to the early work of Paroush and Venezia (1979) who
examine the competitive firm under uncertainty with a bivariate utility function defined
on profits and regret. Our modified regret-theoretical utility function is a tractable version
of theirs in that the bivariate utility function is specified as an additive separable function
such that the degree of regret can be measured by a constant coefficient. Paroush and
Venezia (1979) show that the competitive firm optimally produces less under uncertainty
than under certainty if the firm is more risk averse to profits than to regret and the price
risk is sufficiently small. This is tantamount to restricting the regret coefficient in our model
to be sufficiently small, which is consistent with our findings. Paroush and Venezia (1979)
also provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which the optimal output level under
uncertainty exceeds that under certainty. However, their condition is based on endogenous
variables and thus is not informative. In contrast, we use a binary model to derive sufficient
conditions based on exogenous parameters such that the firm indeed optimally produces
more under uncertainty than under certainty, which is a novel result in the literature of the
competitive firm under uncertainty.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model of the
competitive firm under uncertainty when the firm’s preferences exhibit not only risk aversion
but also regret aversion. Section 3 solves the model and provides sufficient conditions under
which the regret-averse firm’s optimal output level under uncertainty is less than that under
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certainty. Section 4 develops a binary model to show the possibility that introducing regret
aversion to the firm may induce the firm to optimally produce more under uncertainty than
under certainty. The final section concludes.
2. The model
Consider the competitive firm under uncertainty a` la Sandmo (1971). There is one
period with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin, the firm produces a single commodity according
to a deterministic cost function, C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the output level, and C(Q) is
compounded to date 1 with the properties that C(0) = C′(0) = 0, and C′(Q) > 0 and
C′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.2 The firm sells its entire output, Q, at the per-unit price, P˜ , at
date 1. 3 The firm regards P˜ as a random variable that is distributed according to a known
cumulative distribution function, F (P ), over support [P, P ], where 0 < P < P .4 The firm’s
profit at date 1 is therefore uncertain and given by Π(P˜ ) = P˜Q− C(Q).
Paroush and Venezia (1979) define the firm to be regret-averse if its preferences are
represented by a bivariate utility function, V (Π, R), defined on profits and regret, where
Π ≥ 0 is the firm’s profit at date 1, and R = Πmax − Π ≥ 0 is the regret that is equal
to the difference between the actual profit, Π, and the maximum profit, Πmax, that the
firm could have earned if the firm had made the optimal production decision based on
knowing the realized output price. Paroush and Venezia (1979) assume that VΠ(Π, R) > 0,
VR(Π, R) < 0, VΠΠ(Π, R) < 0, VRR(Π, R) < 0, VΠΠ(Π, R)VRR(Π, R) > VΠR(Π, R)
2, and
VΠΠ(Π, R)+ VRR(Π, R)− 2VΠR(Π, R) < 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. For
tractability, we adopt the following specification of V (Π, R) as proposed by Braun and
2The strict convexity of the cost function reflects the fact that the firm’s production technology exhibits
decreasing returns to scale.
3Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
4An alternative way to model the output price uncertainty is to apply the concept of information systems
that are conditional cumulative distribution functions over a set of signals imperfectly correlated with P˜
(Broll et al., 2012).
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Muermann (2004) and Muermann et al. (2006):
V (Π, R) = U(Π)− βG(R), (1)
where U(Π) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function with U ′(Π) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0,
β > 0 is a constant regret coefficient, and G(R) is a regret function such that G(0) = 0,
and G′(R) > 0 and G′′(R) > 0 for all R ≥ 0.5 It is easily verified that all the assumptions
made by Paroush and Venezia (1979) are satisfied by the additive separable utility function
given by Eq. (1).
To characterize the regret-averse firm’s optimal production decision, we have to first
determine the maximum profit, Πmax. If the firm could have observed the realized output
price, P , the maximum profit would be achieved by choosing Q(P ) that solves C′[Q(P )] =
P . This ex-post optimal output level is increasing in P since Q′(P ) = 1/C′′[Q(P )] > 0.
The maximum profit as a function of P is given by Πmax(P ) = PQ(P )−C[Q(P )], which is
increasing in P since Πmax
′
(P ) = Q(P ) > 0.
We can now state the regret-averse firm’s ex-ante decision problem. At date 0, the firm
chooses an output level, Q, so as to maximize the expected value of its regret-theoretical
utility function:
max
Q≥0
E{U [Π(P˜ )]− βG[Πmax(P˜ )−Π(P˜ )]}, (2)
where Π(P ) = PQ − C(Q) and Πmax(P ) = PQ(P ) − C[Q(P )] for all P ∈ [P, P ], and E(·)
is the expectation operator with respect to the cumulative distribution function, F (P ).
3. Solution to the model
5Braun, and Muermann (2004) and Muermann et al. (2006) consider a regret function that depends on
the difference between the utility level of the actual profit and that of the maximum profit, U(Πmax)−U(Π)
(see also Wong, 2011, 2012). Since such a specification is simply a monotonic transformation of ours, none
of the qualitative results are affected if we adopt this alternative approach.
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The first-order condition for program (2) is given by
E
{
{U ′[Π∗(P˜ )] + βG′[Πmax(P˜ )− Π∗(P˜ )]}[P˜ − C′(Q∗)]
}
= 0, (3)
where an asterisk (∗) indicates an optimal level. The second-order condition for program
(2) is given by
E
{
{U ′′[Π∗(P˜ )]− βG′′[Πmax(P˜ )−Π∗(P˜ )]}[P˜ − C′(Q∗)]2
}
−E
{
{U ′[Π∗(P˜ )] + βG′[Πmax(P˜ )−Π∗(P˜ )]}C′′(Q∗)
}
< 0, (4)
which is satisfied given the assumed properties of U(Π), C(Q), and G(R).
As a benchmark, suppose that the uncertain output price, P˜ , is fixed at its expected
value, E(P˜ ). In this benchmark case of certainty, Eq. (3) reduces to C′(Qn) = E(P˜ ), which
is the usual optimality condition that the optimal output level, Qn, is the one that equates
the marginal cost of production, C′(Qn), to the known output price, E(P˜ ).
We are interested in comparing Q∗ with Qn. To this end, we differentiate the objective
function of program (2) with respect to Q and evaluate the resulting the derivative at
Q∗ = Qn to yield
∂E{V [Π(P˜),Πmax(P˜ )− Π(P˜ )]}
∂Q
∣∣∣∣
Q=Qn
= E
{
{U ′[Πn(P˜ )] + βG′[Πmax(P˜ )− Πn(P˜ )]}[P˜ −C′(Qn)]
}
, (5)
where Πn(P ) = PQn−C(Qn) for all P ∈ [P , P ]. If the right-hand side of Eq. (5) is negative
(positive), Eqs. (3) and (4) imply that Q∗ < (>) Qn. The following proposition provides
sufficient conditions under which Q∗ < Qn.
Proposition 1. If U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(R) ≥ 0, then a sufficient condition that ensures
the regret-averse firm to produce less than the optimal output level under certainty, i.e.,
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Q∗ < Qn, is that the constant regret coefficient, β, is sufficiently small such that
β ≤
U ′{Πn[E(P˜ )]} − U ′[Πn(P )]
G′[Πmax(P )− Πn(P )]−G′(0)
. (6)
Proof. Let Ψ(P ) = U ′[Πn(P )] + βG′[Πmax(P ) − Πn(P )]. Since C′(Qn) = E(P˜ ), we can
write Eq. (5) as
∂E{V [Π(P˜),Πmax(P˜ )− Π(P˜ )]}
∂Q
∣∣∣∣
Q=Qn
= E
{
{Ψ(P˜ )−Ψ[E(P˜ )]}[P˜ − E(P˜ )]
}
, (7)
where Ψ[E(P˜ )] = U ′{Πn[E(P˜)]}+βG′(0) since Πmax[E(P˜)] = Πn[E(P˜ )] = E(P˜ )Qn−C(Qn).
Differentiating Ψ(P ) twice with respect to P yields
Ψ′(P ) = U ′′[Πn(P )]Qn + βG′′[Πmax(P )− Πn(P )][Q(P )−Qn], (8)
and
Ψ′′(P ) = U ′′′[Πn(P )]Qn2 + βG′′′[Πmax(P )−Πn(P )][Q(P )−Qn]2
+βG′′[Πmax(P )− Πn(P )]Q′(P ). (9)
Since U ′′′(Π) ≥ 0 and G′′′(R) ≥ 0, Eq. (9) implies that Ψ′′(P ) > 0 for all P ∈ [P, P ].
Since Q(P ) < (>)Qn for all P < (>) E(P˜ ), it follows from Eq. (8) that Ψ′(P ) < 0 for all
P ≤ E(P˜ ). Hence, Ψ(P ) > Ψ[E(P˜ )] for all P < E(P˜ ). Condition (6) ensures that Ψ[E(P˜ )] ≥
Ψ(P ). Since Πn[E(P˜ )] < Πn(P ) and U ′′(Π) < 0, we have U ′{Πn[E(P˜ )]} > U ′[Πn(P )].
Furthermore, Πmax(P ) > Πn(P ) and G′′(R) > 0 so that G′[Πmax(P ) − Πn(P )] > G′(0).
The right-hand side of condition (6) as such is strictly positive so that condition (6) is
non-trivial.
Since Ψ(P ) is strictly convex in P and Ψ′[E(P˜)] < 0, it follows from condition (6) that
Ψ(P ) < Ψ[E(P˜ )] for all P > E(P˜ ). The right-hand side of Eq. (7) as such is negative so
that Q∗ < Qn. 2
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The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. In the limiting case that β = 0, the firm
is purely risk averse. It is well-known that the risk-averse firm produces less than Qn so
as to limit its exposure to the price uncertainty (Sandmo, 1971). For β sufficiently small,
introducing regret aversion to the firm would not substantially change such a risk-sharing
motive, thereby rendering Q∗ < Qn.6
4. A binary model
To gain more insights, we consider in this section a simple binary model such that P˜
takes on the low value, P , with probability p and the high value, P , with probability 1− p,
where 0 < p < 1. In such a binary model, the right-hand side of Eq. (5) becomes
p{U ′[Πn(P )] + βG′[Πmax(P )−Πn(P )]}[P − C′(Qn)]
+(1− p){U ′[Πn(P )] + βG′[Πmax(P )−Πn(P )]}[P − C′(Qn)]
= p(1− p)(P − P ){U ′[Πn(P )] + βG′[Πmax(P )− Πn(P )]
−U ′[Πn(P )]− βG′[Πmax(P )−Πn(P )]}, (10)
where the equality follows from pP + (1− p)P = C′(Qn). If right-hand side of Eq. (10) is
negative (positive), it then follows from Eqs. (3) and (4) that Q∗ < (>) Qn.
Define the following output level, Q◦, that solves
U ′[Π◦(P )] + βG′[Πmax(P )−Π◦(P )] = U ′[Π◦(P )] + βG′[Πmax(P )−Π◦(P )], (11)
where Π◦(P ) = PQ◦−C(Q◦). Since U ′′(Π) < 0, we have U ′[Π◦(P )] < U ′[Π◦(P )]. Eq. (11)
6Paroush and Venezia (1979) show that Q∗ < Qn if the firm is more risk averse to profits than to regret,
i.e., VΠΠ(Π, R) < VRR(Π, R) and if the price risk, P˜ , is sufficiently small. Condition (6) is consistent with
their conditions.
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as such implies that G′[Πmax(P )−Π◦(P )] < G′[Πmax(P )−Π◦(P )]. Differentiating Eq. (11)
with respect to β yields
dQ◦
dβ
= {G′[Πmax(P )−Π◦(P )]−G′[Πmax(P )−Π◦(P )]}
×
{
{βG′′[Πmax(P )− Π◦(P )]− U ′′[Π◦(P )]}[P −C′(Q◦)]
+{βG′′[Πmax(P )− Π◦(P )]− U ′′[Π◦(P )]}[C′(Q◦)− P ]
}−1
> 0. (12)
As β approaches infinity, Q◦ converges to Q† = [Πmax(P )− Πmax(P )]/(P − P ).7 We state
and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the random output price, P˜ , can take on the low value, P ,
with probability p and the high value, P , with probability 1 − p, where 0 < p < 1. There
exists a critical value, p∗, given by
p∗ =
P − C′(Q◦)
P − P
∈ (0, 1), (13)
such that the regret-averse firm optimally produces less (more) than the optimal output level
under certainty, i.e., Q∗ < (>) Qn, for all p < (>) p∗. Furthermore, p∗ decreases with an
increase in the regret coefficient, β, and converges to [P −C′(Q†)]/(P −P ) as β approaches
infinity.
Proof. Let Φ(p) = U ′[Πn(P )]+βG′[Πmax(P )−Πn(P )]−U ′[Πn(P )]−βG′[Πmax(P )−Πn(P )].
Differentiating Φ(p) with respect to p yields8
Φ′(p) = {pβG′′[Πmax(P )−Πn(P )] + (1− p)βG′′[Πmax(P )− Πn(P )]
−pU ′′[Πn(P )]− (1− p)U ′′[Πn(P )]}
(P − P )2
C′′(Qn)
> 0, (14)
7The limiting output level, Q†, solves G′[Πmax(P ) − PQ† +C(Q†)] = G′[Πmax(P )− PQ† + C(Q†)].
8In this binary model, we have dQn/dp = (P − P )/C′′(Qn) < 0.
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since U ′′(Π) < 0, G′′(R) > 0, and pP+(1−p)P = C′(Qn). At p = 0, we haveQn = Q(P ). In
this case, Φ(0) = U ′[Πmax(P )]−U ′{PQ(P )−C[Q(P )]}+β{G′(0)−G′{Πmax(P )−PQ(P )+
C[Q(P )]}} < 0 since U ′′(Π) < 0 and G′′(R) > 0. On the other hand, at p = 1, we have
Qn = Q(P ). In this case, Φ(1) = U ′{PQ(P )−C[Q(P )]}−U ′[Πmax(P )]+β{G′{Πmax(P )−
PQ(P )+C[Q(P )]}−G′(0)} > 0 since U ′′(Π) < 0 and G′′(R) > 0. It then follows from Eq.
(14) that there exists a unique point, p∗ ∈ (0, 1), such that Φ(p) < (>) 0 and Q∗ < (>) Qn
for all p < (>) p∗. At p∗, we have Φ(p∗) = 0. It then follows from Eqs. (3) and (10) that
Q∗ = Qn = Q◦ since Q◦ solves Eq. (11). Eq. (13) then follows from p∗P + (1 − p∗)P =
C′(Q◦). From Eq. (12), we have dp∗/dβ < 0 and thus p∗ converges to [P −C′(Q†)]/(P−P )
as β approaches infinity. 2
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. When P is very likely to be seen at date
1, Qn is closer to Q(P ) and further way from Q(P ). Introducing regret aversion, which is
sufficiently severe, to the firm makes the firm take into account the substantial disutility
from the large discrepancy of its output level, Qn − Q(P ), when the low output price is
revealed. To avoid regret, the regret-averse firm optimally adjusts its output level downward
from Qn to move closer to Q(P ) so that Q∗ < Qn when p is small. On the other hand, when
P is very likely to be seen at date 1, in this case Qn is close to Q(P ). The regret-averse firm
as such optimally adjusts its output level upward from Qn to reduce the discrepancy of its
output level, Q(P )−Q∗, when the high output price is revealed. Hence, we have Q∗ > Qn
when p is large.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we incorporate regret theory into Sandmo’s (1971) model of the com-
petitive firm under uncertainty. Regret-averse preferences are characterized by a modified
utility function that includes additive separable disutility from having chosen ex-post sub-
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optimal alternatives. The extent of regret depends on the difference between the actual
profit and the maximum profit attained by making the optimal production decision had the
firm observed the true realization of the random output price. We show that the conven-
tional result of the extant literature that the optimal output level under uncertainty is less
than that under certainty holds if the firm is not too regret averse. This suggests that it is
possible that the firm may optimally produces more, not less, under uncertainty than under
certainty. We verify such a conjecture by using a simple binary model wherein the random
output price can only take on a low value or a high value with positive probability. We
show that the non-conventional result holds in the binary model if the firm is sufficiently
regret averse and the low output price is very likely to prevail. Regret aversion as such
plays a distinctive role, vis-a`-vis risk aversion, in shaping the production decision of the
competitive firm under uncertainty.
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